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ABSTRACT 
In Sonap Petroleum (formerly known as Sonarep) (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadog1an1s 
1992 (3) SA 234 (A) the Appellate Division apparently approved the direct 
application of the reliance theory, without reference to prejudice or fault, to 
determine contractual liability in the absence of consensus. 
The various approaches to contractual liability in South African law are 
examined, and a comparative study of English law and the law of the Netherlands 
is conducted. 
It is submitted that the element of fault is not crucial to the enquiry, but 
rather, the e 1 ement s of conduct , i nducement and a reas onab 1 e re 1 i a nee upon 
consensus. It is cone l uded that the test for contractua 1 l i abi l i ty in the absence 
of actual consensus, as formula ted by the court in Sonap • s case, without 
reference to prejudice or fault, has established sound precedent in South African 
law. 
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1 
Introduction 
South African courts have not consistently applied any single theory of 
contractual liability. Two distinct approaches have emerged: first, the 
application of the subjective consensual (intention} theory, which requires 
consensus ad idem, a meeting of the minds of the respective parties, and, 
secondly, the application of the objective declaration theory, which 
requires correspondence of the dec 1 a red intentions of the respective 
parties. 
Where there is alleged d1ssensus, in some cases the consensual theory has 
been tempered With the application of the reliance theory, while in other 
cases the courts have resolved the issue on the basis of estoppel. Another 
approach has been to qualify the declaration theory by the application of 
the 1ustus error doctrine. In addition, regardless of which approach has 
been adopted, there has been controversy as to whether the elements of 
prejudice and fault play a decisive role. 
In Sonap Petroleum (formerly known as Sonarep) (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Pappadog1an1s 1 , the full bench of the Appellate Division rejected the 
estoppel approach and apparently approved the direct application of the 
reliance theory, without reference to fau 1 t. The test for contractua 1 
liability, as formulated by the court, in Sonap's case, appears to be a 
novel one. However. the decision is based largely upon the oft-quoted dictum 
of Blackburn J, made well over a century ago, in the English case of Sm1th 
v Hughes 2: 
1 
2 
'If, whatever a man•s real intention may be, he so conducts 
himself that a reasonable man would believe that he was 
assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and that 
other party upon that belief enters into the contract with him, 
1992 (3) SA 234 (A). 
(1871) LR 6 QB 597. 
the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he 
had intended to agree to the other party's terms ••• "3 
2 
I propose to exami'ne the various approaches to contractual liability in 
South African law, with reference to the manner in which the Blackburn 
d1ctum has been applied. Consideration will also be given to some other 
legal systems, in particular those of England and the Netherlands, with a 
view to deciding whether the court, in Sonap's case, has correctly stated 
the requirements for the application of the reliance theory and whether its 
test for contractual liability, without reference to prejudice or fault, 
provides an adequate solution in cases in which actual consensus is lacking. 
3 At 607. 
3 
2 Various approaches to contractual liability 
The application of the two basic theories, namely the subjective consensual 
theory and the objective declaration theory have been qualified by the 
following: 
2.1 Estoppel by Representation 
The Blackburn dictum has been regarded by some courts as an expression of 
the estoppel doctrine4 , which was received into South African law via the 
Eng 1 ish 1 aw. After a 11, as Kahn5 points out, the word 'prec 1 ude ' 5 is a 
synonym for 'estop•. 
Estoppel is of general application in our law and is not confined to 
contractual obligations. Estoppel is based on a representation. If one party 
represents to the other that a certain state of affairs exists or does not 
exist, and another party acts in reasonable reliance upon such 
representation to his prejudice, then the former cannot be heard to say (in 
other words, he is estopped from saying) that a different state of affairs 
existed. Traditionally, estoppel operates as a defence and not as a cause 
of action. 
In the context of contractual liability, if X has induced Y reasonably to 
believe that X intends to bind himself on certain terms, then X may be 
4 
5 
6 
see, for example, Van Ryn Wine and Spiri~ Company v 
Chandos Bar 1928 TPD 417; Peri-urban Areas Heal~h 
Board v Bree~ NO and ano~her 1958 (3) SA 783 (T); 
Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 (1) SA 418 (A). Cf Petit v 
Abrahamson (II) 1946 NPD 673 at 682 and Ocean Cargo 
Line L~d v F R Waring (P~y) L~d 1963 (4) SA 641 (A) at 
653, where the question whether the Blackburn dictum 
embodied the doctrine of estoppel was expressly left 
open. 
E Khan Con~rac~ and Mercan~ile Law Vol I 2 ed (1988) 
15. 
The word 'preclude' was used by Blackburn J in his 
dic~um, in the sentence preceding the quotation at 
note 3. 
4 
estopped from denying that he agreed to those terms. Liability therefore 
rests on a fiction: there is no actual contract between X andY, and X (who 
created the reliance upon consensus by Y) may not enforce the contract, yet 
neither may X deny the existence of it. 
In South African law there is both case authori ti and some academic 
support8 for the estoppel approach to the basis of liability in the absence 
of actual consensus. Although, generally, it may be said that fault and 
prejudice are requirements for the operation of estoppel, this does not 
appear to be a hard and fast rule. While proof of fault has been held to be 
a requirement in some situations, it has not been required in others. 9 It 
is noteworthy that the fault requirement was not mentioned by Blackburn J 
in his dictum in Smith v Hughes 10 , nor was fault required in Freeman v 
Cooke1\ the case referred to by Blackburn J in the formulation of his 
dictum. Furthermore, the requirement of prejudice does not necessarily 
7 
a 
9 
10 
11 
See note 4. 
JC de Wet 'Estoppel by Representation' in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg (1939) 73; JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De 
Wet en Yeats Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg 4 ed (1978) 21; W de Vos 'Mistake in 
Contract' (1976) Acta Juridica 181. 
Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (1993) 
24. In Connock's (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal 
Westelike Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk 1964 (2) SA 47 
(T) Trollip J required fault on the part of the 
representor, in that he ought, as a reasonable man, to 
have foreseen that his conduct would mislead another. 
Cf Coetzee v Vander Westhuizen 1958 (3) SA 847 (T); 
Credit Corporation of SA Ltd v Botha 1968 (4) SA 837 
(N); Johaadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) (Pty) Ltd 1970 
·( 1) SA 3 9 4 (A) ; Sonda y v Surrey Estate Modern Meat 
Market (Pty) Ltd 1983 (2) SA 521 (C), being cases in 
which fault was not required. 
Supra notes 2 and 3. 
(1848) 2 Ex 654, referred to in Smith v Hughes supra 
at 607. 
5 
entail financial loss, but if a party enters into contract this may be 
viewed as sufficient alteration of his position to constitute prejudice. 12 
2.2 The Reliance Theory 
Traditionally, the consensual theory has been tempered with the application 
of the reliance theory (also known as the theory of quasi-mutual assent) in 
the following manner: where there is alleged dissensus, where X has created 
a reasonable belief of consensus in the mind of Y, upon which Y relied, then 
Y may hold X bound to his expressed intention, even if this differs from his 
(X's) actual intention. 
In Saambou-Nasiona1e Bouvereniging v Friedman13 the Appellate Division, per 
Jansen JA, first indicated a preference for the application of the 
consensual theory, tempered with the reliance theory. Jansen JA referred to 
the B 1 ackburn dictum, which he considered to amount to a form of the 
reliance theory. 14 Such an approach has been endorsed in subsequently 
reported decisions of the Appellate Oivision15 , and, more recently, by the 
full bench, per Harms AJA, in Sonap's case, and per Botha JAin Steyn v LSA 
Motors L td16 • 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Peri-urban Areas Health Board v Breet NO and another 
supra note 4 at 790. This line of reasoning is 
supported by W de Vos op cit note 8 at 181. 
1979 (3) SA 978 (A). 
At 995. 
See, for example, Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk 
v Kemp en De Beer 1979 (4) SA 74 (A); Spes Bona Bank 
Ltd v Portals Water Treatment South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
1983 (1) SA 978 (A). 
1994 (1) SA 49 (A). 
6 
The application of the doctrine of estoppel has been compared to the direct 
application of the reliance theory17 • There are similarities between the 
approach of estoppel by representation and the application of the reliance 
theory, in that both i nvo 1 ve e 1 ements of inducement and reasonab 1 e re 1 i ance. 
However, these two approaches are essentially quite different, the most 
significant distinction being that, in the case of estoppel, liability is 
based upon a fiction, whereas, with the application of the reliance theory, 
recognition may be given to an actual contract and full contractual 
liability, with concomitant rights, may arise. 
As with estoppel, contention has arisen as to whether prejudice and fault 
are required. Christie submits that there is no necessity to prove 
prejudice, nor fault or blame, but that Blackburn J 'intended to advance the 
law a stage further so as to give the misled party something more than the 
defence of estoppel - to give him, in fact, the contract that he was 
entitled to think he had.'m 
In Saambou-Nas1ona1e Bouveren1g1ng v Fr1edman 19 , Jansen JA, having referred 
extensively to various South African and overseas authorities, left open the 
question whether fault is a requirement for the application of the reliance 
theory. In Sonap's case, Harms AJA decided that the introduction of the 
fault principle 'appears to be unnecessary• •20 
17 
18 
19 
20 
See, for example, K Kritzinger 'Approach to Contract: 
A Reconciliation' (1983) SALJ 47; ADJ Van Rensburg 
'Die Grondslag van Kontrakteule Verbondenheid' (1986) 
THRHR 448. 
RH Christie The Law of Contract in south Africa 2 ed 
(1991) 27. 
Supra note 13. 
supra note 1 at 240 G. 
7 
2.3 Iustus Error 
In some cases21 the declaration theory2 has been qualified by the doctrine 
of iustus error in the following manner: Where X, by relying on his mistake, 
wishes to resile from a contract which he has apparently concluded with V, 
X may only do so if his mistake was material and reasonable {iustus). If X 
has been 'to blame• in the sense that by his conduct he has led V reasonably 
to believe that he {X) was binding himself on certain terms/3 then X's 
mistake wi 11 not be regarded as 1 ustus and X may not avoid 1 i abi 1 i ty. 
However, if X's mistake is due to a misrepresentation by V, then V is 'to 
blame• and X will not be bound, but may avoid liability on the basis of his 
mistake. 24 
The doctrine of 1ustus error has been said to be 'a manifestation of the 
reliance theory, with elements such as reasonable reliance, inducement and 
possibly also fault and prejudice being relevant to its operation. 125 
Indeed, the application of the doctrine of 1ustus error has been regarded 
as the indirect application of the reliance theory.~ 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
For example, Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior 
Acoustics (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 537 (W); Du Toit v 
Atkinson's Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA 893 (A); Spindrirter 
(Pty) Ltd v Lester Donavan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 
(A) ; Nasionale Behuisingskorranissie v Grey ling 19 8 6 ( 4) 
SA 917 (T); Kok v Osborne 1993 (4) SA 788 (SEC). 
MFB Reinecke 'Regstreekse of Onregstreekse Toepassing 
van die Vertrouensteorie' (1986) TSAR 510. Cf G Lubbe 
and c Murray Farlam and Hathaway Contract 3 ed (1988) 
at 165 and Van der Merwe et al op cit note 9 at 34, 
who view the iustus error doctrine as a qualification 
of the consensual (intention) theory. 
George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) at 
471. 
Ibid. 
Lubbe and Murray op cit note 22 at 168. 
ADJ van Rensburg 'Die Grondslag van Kontrakteule 
Gebondenheid' (1986) THRHR 453; Reinecke op cit note 
22 at 509. 
8 
It has been explained thus21 : With the direct application of the reliance 
theory, once the contract-assertor has established that there is an apparent 
contract and the resiler has raised a doubt in the mind of the court as to 
whether he intended to be bound by such a contract, the contract-assertor 
must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the resi ler induced a 
reliance by the contract-assertor upon the former having the intention to 
bind himself on certain terms with the latter. On the other hand, in the 
application of the doctrine of justus error, once the contract-assertor has 
proved the existence of an apparent contract, the resiler bears the onus of 
proving on a balance of probabilities that he laboured under a mistake which 
was material and reasonable. Where he establishes that the contract-assertor 
induced a reasonable reliance on his part that the contract-assertor 
intended to bind himself to terms other than those contained in the apparent 
contract, then he will be able to avoid liability. If he fails to discharge 
this onus then he may be contractually liable. 
Thus, by the direct application of the reliance theory the induced reliance 
is directly and explicitly protected~ by holding the person who induced the 
re 1 i ance (the contract -res i1 er) 1 i ab 1 e. On the contrary, through the 
application of the doctrine of justus error, the induced reliance upon 
consensus is protected indirectly or obliquely: if it is the contract-
assertor who induced the reasonable reliance on the part of the resiler, 
then the error wi 11 be regarded as justus and the resiler may avoid 
liability; if it is the resiler who induced the reasonable reliance on the 
part of contract-assertor then he will be 'to blame' 29 for his error and he 
may not avoid liability. 
Reinecke30 , while conceding that the iustus error approach is aimed at the 
protection of a reasonable reliance upon consensus, questions whether it 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Van Rensburg op cit note 26; Lubbe and Murray op cit 
note 22 at 168; Van der Merwe et al op cit note 9 at 
33. 
Lubbe and Murray op cit note 22 at 168. 
See note 23. 
Op cit note 22 at 511. 
9 
will always yield the same results as the direct application of the reliance 
theory. He submits that the i ustus error approach offers no basis for 
contractual liability, but is rather a recipe to establish whether a person 
can avoid liability on an apparent contract. In Reinecke•s view the tustus 
error approach fails in a situation where there is no apparent contract, or 
where the party seeking to enforce the contract does so on the basis of a 
reasonable reliance upon terms which are not contained in an apparent 
contract. 31 Reinecke prefers the direct application of the reliance theory 
as the more convincing and simple approach towards liability in the absence 
of consensus. 
Van der Merwe et al 32 submit that the doctrine of 1ustus error is not an 
alternative approach to contractual liability, but is rather the practical 
way in which the courts - albeit haphazardly - have allowed objective 
considerations to qualify the logical consequences of the will theory where 
one of the parties to an apparent contract raises a material mistake. They 
perceive the 1ustus error approach as the combination of two stages in the 
process of determining the existence of contractual liability: first the 
application of the will theory (where a material mistake will exclude 
consensus), qualified by the application of the reliance theory (where the 
party who nevertheless wishes to hold the mistaken party bound must prove 
a reasonable reliance upon consensus). 
While there is strong case authority in South African law for the 
app 1 i cation of the doctrine of 1 ustus error as basis for contractua 1 
liability. again. there has been much controversy as to whether the elements 
of fault and prejudice are requirements for its application. 33 
31 
32 
33 
Op cit note 22 at 512. See, for example, Spindrifter 
(Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd supra note 21. 
Op cit note 9 at 32 and 39. 
See, for example, Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd supra note 21 at 539 G; 
Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling supra note 
21; Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk supra note 21; 
Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd supra 
note 21. 
10 
Despite this apparently conflicting authority, Harms AJA, in Sonap's case, 
regarded neither prejudice nor fault as a requirement, and was of the 
opinion that the authorities, referred to by the judges in the cases in 
which the 1ustus error doctrine was applied, and to which the court, in 
Sonap's case, was referred, were mere adaptations of the Blackburn d1ctum. 34 
34 At 239 F - H. 
11 
3 The Sonap decision 
3.1 A summary of facts 
The respondent, Pappadogianis, in terms of a duly registered notarial deed 
of principal lease, let his property to the appellant, Sonap Petroleum, for 
a period of 20 years. Almost 12 years later a notarial addendum to the lease 
was signed by the respondent and the appellant's managing director. By the 
mistake of the appellant's attorney, the term of the lease was reflected in 
the notarial addendum as 15 years. Once this was detected, the appellant 
sought rectification of the addendum, to reflect a term of 20 years and, in 
the a 1 ternat i ve, an order dec 1 ari ng the addendum, in the 1 i ght of the 
mistake, to be void. 
The Witwatersrand local Division dismissed the claim with costs. In an 
appeal to the Appellate Division it was found~, on the facts, that the 
respondent had read the addendum and had realised that the term had been 
amended. The dismissal of the claim for rectification was confirmed36 • 
Further, the Appellate Division held that 'the respondent was not misled by 
the appellant to believe that it was its intention to amend the period, but, 
on the contrary, that he was alive to the real possibility of a mistake and 
that he had, in the circumstances, a duty to speak and to enquire'. 37 It was 
held~ that because he did not speak or enquire, but decided to "snatch the 
bargain", there was no consensus, actual or imputed, on this issue. The 
court accordingly declared void39 that part of the addendum which stated 
that the lease was for a period of 15 years. 
35 At 238 C. 
36 At 238 F. 
37 At 242 A - B. 
38 At 242 B. 
39 At 242 E. 
12 
3.2 The legal basis of the decision 
Harms AJA apparently approved the application of the reliance theory, in 
that he framed the decisive question thus: 
'did the party whose actual intention did not conform to the 
common intention expressed, lead the other party, as a 
reasonable man, to believe that his declared intention 
represented his actual intention?'~ 
It was held that to answer this question a three-fold enquiry 
is usually necessary: 
1 Was there a misrepresentation as to one party's intention? 
2 Who made that representation? 
3 Was the other party misled thereby? 
This last question postulates two possibilities: Was he actually 
misled and would a reasonable man have been misled?'~1 
If the respondent realised (or should have realised as a reasonable man) 
that there was a real possibility of a mistake in the offer, he would have 
had a duty to speak and enquire whether the expressed offer was the intended 
offer. Only thereafter could he accept.Q Harms AJA concluded that '(t)he 
snapping up of a bargain in the knowledge of such a possibility would not 
be bona fide. Whether there is a duty to speak will obviously depend on the 
facts of each case.·~ 
40 
41 
42 
43 
At 239 I - J. 
At 239 J - 240 B. 
Harms AJA, at 241 B, found support for this 
proposition in Sherry v Moss (WLD 3 September 1952 
unreported) which was quoted in Kahn op cit note 5 at 
300. For additional authority referred to, see Sonap's 
case supra note 1 at 241 B - D. 
At 241 D. 
13 
Harms AJA rejected the estoppel approach to contractual liability on the 
basis that it 'merely bedevils the enquiry and that reliance thereon is not 
conducive to clear thinking.•~ He also found that the introduction of the 
fault principle 'appears to be unnecessary.•~ He observed that the 
application of the test, as formulated in the Sonap decision, would not have 
affected the outcome of certain earlier cases where fault had been 
considered~ and he also mentioned Appellate Division authority where the 
court 'did not consider whether the representor was negligent, but merely 
whether a representation had been made, nor was the matter approached along 
the lines of estoppel.'Q 
What is noteworthy about the decision in Sonap's case is that the court, in 
effect, reached its conclusion that fault was unnecessary in the direct 
application of the reliance theory by referring to cases decided on the 
basis of the doctrine of iustus error. Thus the decision seems to amount 
to an attempt by the court to reconcile the direct application of the 
reliance theory with the application of the doctrine of iustus error.~ 
The decision in Sonap's case has been welcomed for its approval of the 
direct app 1 i cation of the re 1 i ance theory as basis for contractua 1 1 i abi 1 i ty 
in cases where actual consensus is lacking. 49 Kerr has welcomed the 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
At 240 D - E. 
At 240 G. 
Harms AJA referred to Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd supra note 21, in which 
Coetzee J had said that 'the fault principle looms 
large' in determining whether an error is iustus, and 
also Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling supra 
note 21. 
At 240 I. 
TB Floyd and C-J Pretorius 'A Reconciliation of the 
Different Approaches to Contractual Liability in the 
Absence of Actual Consensus' (1992) THRHR 668. 
Floyd and Pretorius op cit note 48 at 670. 
14 
recognition of the requirement of good faith in entering into a contract.~ 
However, the decision has also been the object of much criticism. 51 The 
apparent rejection of fault as a requirement has been welcomed by Kerr~, 
yet it has been criticized by others. For example, Van der Merwe and Van 
Huyssteen~ prefer not to interpret the judgment of Harms AJA as an express 
rejection of the fault principle but rather as the questioning of the 
fundamental role of fault in the context of reasonable reliance and 
reasonable error. They submit that while proof of fault is not an absolute 
requirement for the operation of a reasonable reliance upon consensus or 
upon a reasonable mistake, it nevertheless performs a useful function in 
deciding, upon consideration of the various relevant factors, whether a 
party's reliance is reasonable or not. Similar submissions are made by Van 
der Merwe et a l • 54 
Floyd and Pretorius55 have submitted that blame, incorporating fault and 
risk, cannot be ignored in the enquiry into contractual liability in the 
absence of actual consensus, without the pass i bil ity of i nequi table results. 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
AJ Kerr 'Good Faith in Negotiating a Contract. The 
Duty to Enquire If There Is a Perceived or Apparent 
Mistake in Communication' 1993 THRHR 296. 
Floyd and Pretorius op cit note 48; S Van der Merwe 
and LF Van Huyssteen 'Kontraksluiting en Toerekenbare 
Skyn' (1993) TSAR 493; Vander Merwe et al op cit note 
9 at 40. 
Kerr op cit note 50 at 298. 
Op cit note 51 at 496. 
Op cit note 9 at 38. 
Op cit note 48 at 671. The authors make the same 
submission, with regard to the application of the 
doctrine of iustus error, in 'Mistake and Supervening 
Impossibility of Performance Kok v Osborne 1993 (4} SA 
788 (SEC)' 1994 (57) THRHR 325 at 327. 
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In order to evaluate the decision 7 in Sonap's case 7 in light of these 
criticisms, it may be useful to examine the extent to which the court's 
approach compares with that in other legal systems. 
16 
4 Comparative Approaches 
I have chosen to compare, in particular, English law, the very system in 
which the Blackburn dictum originated. Another valuable comparison is the 
law of the Netherlands. Despite codification, the law of the Netherlands 
regarding contractual l i abi 1 i ty coincides to a large extent with South 
African law, and a study of it may yield useful guidelines which our law may 
follow. 
4.1 English Law 
As Kahn56 points out, in English Law the Blackburn dictum has not achieved 
the status which it has in South African law. However, the Blackburn dictum 
has been regarded57 as the expression of the 'objective principle', which 
plays a fundamental role in cases regarding mistake in contract. 
At common law a mistake may negative~ consent when it leads to a 
/
misunderstanding between parties so that they are at cross purposes and 
there is no actual agreement between them. There are three recognised types 
of mistake which may give rise to a lack of consensus, viz fundamental 
·mistake as to the identity of the other party, 59 fundamental mistake as to 
the subject matter of the contract00 and mistake as to the terms of the 
contract. 61 The mistake must have induced the mistaken party to enter into 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Op cit note 5 at 15. 
G H Treitel The Law of Contract 8 ed (1991) 1. 
Treitel op cit note 57 at 261. 
As in CUndy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459. 
Falck v Williams [1900] A C 176. 
Hartog v Colin Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566; Woodhouse 
A c Israel Cocoa Ltd v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co 
[1972] AC 320. 
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he contract.~ Further, the mistake must be operative. It is in determining 
whether a mistake is operative that the objective approach to contractual 
liability becomes relevant.~ 
At common law, a mistake which negatives consent does not necessarily render 
the contract void.~ In such a case, although genuine agreement is absent,~ 
the 'objective principle• is applied.~ This 'objective principle• is based 
on the needs of commercial convenience. 67 The question to be considered is 
not what was in the minds of the respective parties, but what reasonable 
third parties would infer from the words or conduct of the parties.~ Steyn 
LJ has explained it thus: 
'A theme that runs through our law of contract is that the 
reasonable expectations of honest men must be protected. it is 
not a rule or principle of law. It is the objective which has 
been and still is the principal moulding force of our law of 
contract.·~ 
Furmston, referring to the Blackburn dictum, explains the objective approach 
thus: 'the result is that if, from the whole of the evidence, a reasonable 
man would infer the existence of a contract in a given sense, the court, 
notwithstanding a material mistake, will hold that a contract in that sense 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Treitel op cit note 57 at 268. 
Treitel op cit note 57 at 270. 
Robinson, Fisher &·Harding v Behar [1927] KB 513. 
Van Praagh v Everidge [1903] 1 Ch 434. 
Smith v Hughes supra note 2. 
Treitel op cit note 57 at 1. 
Cornish v Abington. (1859) 4 H & N 549; Smith v Hughes 
supra note 2; Blay ·V Pollard & Morris [1930] 1 KB 628; 
Centrovincial Estates p/c v Merchant Investors 
Assurance Co Ltd [1983] Com L R 158. 
First Energy (UK) ~td v Hungarian International Bank 
Ltd 1993 BCLC 1409. 
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is binding upon both parties. The apparent contract will stand. ' 70 
Furthermore~ the party who alleges the mistake bears the onus of having to 
persuade the court to disturb what to outward appearances is a binding 
contract. 71 
While, as in South Africa, some have regarded the Blackburn dictum as an 
expression of the estoppel doctrine72 , Treitel points out that estoppel 
requires detrimental reliance, 'while a person who invokes the objective 
principle need only show that he has entered into the contract in reliance 
on the appearance of the agreement created by the other • s conduct. ' 73 
Smith~ also rejects estoppel as the foundation of the objective approach, 
but explains the possible role of estoppel in precluding either party from 
setting up the objective meaning of the agreement against the other where 
both have reached actual agreement on terms which differ from the objective 
meaning of the agreement. 
The mistake will be operative, in other words, the objective principle will 
not apply, where there is such ambiguity in the circumstances that a 
reasonable person could not draw any inference from them at all • 75 The 
contract would therefore be void. 
Further, the objective principle wi 11 not apply where the mistake of the one 
party was known to the other.~ In this context a man is taken to have known 
70 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
MP Furmston Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston 's Law of 
Contract 12 ed (1993) 249. See Wood v Scarth (1858) 1 
F & F 293; Scott v Littledale (1858) 8 E & B 815. 
Furmston op cit note 70 at 248. 
See Halsbury's Laws of England 4 ed (1974) 166. 
Op cit note 57 at 270. 
JC Smith Smith and Thomas A Casebook on Contract 9 ed 
(1992) 109. 
As in Raffles v Wichelhaus Exchequer (1864) 2 H & C 
906. 
As in Smith v Hughes supra note 2. 
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what would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances. 77 
In spite of the common law, equity affords possible further relief for 
'honest mistakes in contracts•, when circumstances call for it.m 
Thus, it appears that in English law the issue of contractual liability 
entails a subjective approach, which requires a meeting of the minds, 
tempered with 'the objective principle', which is largely similar to the 
direct application of the reliance theory in South African law. Both 
approaches entail considerations of 'inducement' and 'reasonable reliance' 
upon consensus having been reached. Neither fault nor prejudice is a 
requirement for the operation of the 'objective principle'.~ 
77 
78 
79 
As in Hartog v Colin and Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566 
and Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cases 459. 
Furmston op cit note 70 at 258. For instance, courts 
may, in the absence of fraud on the part of the 
mistaken party, refuse to grant a decree of specific 
performance, if it would impose a burden not 
contemplated by such mistaken party, or where it would 
grant an 'unconscionable advantage' to either party. 
See Burrow v scammel~ (1881) 19 ChD 175 at 182. See 
also Treitel op cit note 57 at 275 and 279 ff with 
regard to rescission and rectification as forms of 
equitable relief. 
Schriven Bros & Co v Hindley & Co [ 1913] KB 564 
provides authority for the proposition that a mistake 
will be operative where it has been negligently 
.induced by the other party. However, I submit that the 
outcome would have been the same had the decision been 
made on the basis of inducement of reasonable reliance 
by the other party, without any reference to 
negligence. 
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4.2 The law of the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the subjective theory, or wi 11 theory ( 'wi lsteorie'), was 
strictly applied until the second half of the nineteenth century.w Since 
then, two main theoretical approaches81 to the basis of contractual 
liability have emerged. While one approach uses the subjective intention of 
the parties as its basis, and the other the objectified intention of the 
parties~, both approaches use the reliance theory as supplementary basis 
for liability. 83 
The law of the Netherlands has been codified and contractual issues must be 
decided according to the principles contained in the New Civil Code. The New 
Civil Code does not provide a solution to the theoretical problem of the 
basis of contractual liability.M Article 3.33 of the New Civil Code 
provides that a juridical act requires an intention to produce legal effect, 
which intention has manifested itself by a declaration, while article 3.35 
protects a party's reliance on declarations or conduct of the other party, 
even if they do not conform to that other party's actual intentions. Thus, 
it has been submitted that the pract i ca 1 resu 1 t of these provisions is 
something close to the reliance theory: 'that a party may be bound beyond 
80 
Bl 
82 
83 
84 
AS Hartkamp Asser-Rutten Handleiding tot de Beoefening 
van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: 
Verbintenissenrecht Part II Algemene Leer der 
Overeenkomsten 9 ed (1993) 89. 
A third approach· is advocated by JM Van Dunne 
Normatiewe Uitleg van Rechtshandelinge (1971). 
AR Bloembergen and WM Kleyn Contractenrecht Part II 
(1986) paragraphs 22 and 23. 
Asser-Rutten op cit note 80 at 90. In the absence of 
actual consensus ·the 'toerekenbare schijn' of a 
party's intention becomes relevant; parties will be 
contractually bound where one party has been 
responsible for the formation of a reliance ( 'op 
toerekenbare wijze opgewekte vertrouwen') upon 
consensus. 
Asser-Rutten op cit note 80 at 91. 
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his will, if it is due to him that another on good grounds believes him to 
consent.~~ In such a case there is a valid contract. 
Further, the concept of good faith permeates Dutch contract law.~ Article 
6.1 para 2 provides that both parties to an obligation should behave in 
their relationship according to what is reasonable and equitable. Article 
6.248 para 1 provides that contracts not only have the effects expressly 
agreed upon, but also those which, according to the nature of the contract, 
result from the law, usage or the requirements of reasonableness and equity. 
Traditionally, in Dutch law a distinction is drawn between a 'one1gen11jke 
dwaling', which results in d1ssensus, and an 'e1gen11jke dwaJing', where 
there is consensus, but where the consent of one party is achieved by a 
misrepresentation.~ 
Articles 6. 228- 230 of the New Civil Code deal with defects in consent. 
Provision is made for a contract to be annulled, or its effect modified, 
where there is a mistake without which the contract would not have been 
made, provided 
a) the mistake was caused by information given by the other party; or 
b) had the other party been aware, or ought the other party to have been 
aware, of the mistake, the other party should have informed the mistaken 
party about his mistake ; or 
c) there has been a significant mutual mistake. 
85 
86 
87 
AS Hartkamp 'The binding force of contract in Dutch 
law' Binding Force of Contract (1991) 43. 
Hartkamp op cit note 85 at 45. 
Asser-Rutten op cit note 80 at 153. 
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The contract may not be annulled for a mistake solely as to a future fact, 
or a mistake for which, according to 'common opinion 
of the case • , the mistaken party must take 
( 'reken1 ng' ) . 88 
in the circumstances 
the res pons i b i1 i t y 
The exact circumstances within which a party must take responsibility for 
a mistake has long been the subject of academic debate. It is not a 
requirement that prejudice be suffered by the mistaken part~, neither is 
it necessary that fault be proved. Meijers~ refers to the theoretical basis 
of culpa 1n contrahendo and submits that fault is not a requirement, 
although it may be relevant to apply the 'risk principle• on the basis that 
if a party created the danger that others would understand him to have 
intended to bind himself on certain terms, he should be held responsible for 
the consequences. 91 However, Meijers questions whether the risk principle 
should be accepted and applied completely, as he has reservations about 
holding a party responsible, in all cases, for the mistakes, or fault, of 
a third party. 
Bloembergen and Kleyn~, in their analysis of the various bases for 
contractual liability in terms of the reliance theory, mention, amongst 
others, culpa 1n contrahendo (which is based on fault), the 
'toedoenbeg1nse1' (which does not necessarily require fault, but where the 
reliance upon consensus was caused by the action of one party, or, in other 
words, is attributable to him), and the risk principle, the 'gevaarzetttngs-
ea 
8SI 
SIO 
Sll 
Sl2 
Asser-Rutten op cit note 80 at 161; M Whincup Contract 
Law and Practice: The English System and Continental 
Comparisons 2 ed (1991} 210. 
Asser-Rutten op cit note 80 at 98, where the 
submission is made that the requirement of good faith 
('de goede trouw'} is sufficient to provide an 
equitable solution. 
EM Meijers Versamelde Privaatrechtelijke Opstellen 
Part III Verbintenissenrecht (1955) 84. 
Meijers uses the case where a third party incorrectly 
communicates the intention of one contracting party to 
the other, for example, the case of the 'garbled 
telegram'. 
Op cit note 82 paragraph 26. 
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of r1s1cobeg1nseJ•. The last mentioned is a variation of the 
'toedoenbeginse1 ', where a party who creates the risk of the incorrect 
communication of his intention to the other should take responsibility for 
any mistakes in communi cation. Bloembergen and Kleyn submit that the 
existence of 'toerekenbare schijn' must be decided according to the 
circumstances of each case.~ 
Van Dunne~ submits that good faith pervades the application of the reliance 
theory. His view is that at the heart of contractual liability is not the 
requirement of consensus, but the 'toereken1ngs1eer'~: that a person should 
assume responsibility for the legal consequences which are attributable to 
him. 
93 Op cit note 82 paragraph 27. 
Op cit note 81 at 3. 
95 Ibid. 
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5 The Requirement of Prejudice 
The requirement of prejudice has its origin in the doctrine of estoppel. 
Prejudice was required by Professor De Wet~ in his work and many, relying 
upon De Wet, require the same. My submission is that in light of the 
rejection of estoppel as the basis of contractual liability, there is no 
need for prejudice or detriment to be proved. 
Besides, even to the extent that one could interpret the Blackburn dictum 
as an expression of the doctrine of estoppel, Blackburn J relied on a line 
of estoppel cases which did not require prejudice. Moreover, if merely 
entering into a contract is sufficient alteration of one's position to 
fulfil the requirement of prejudice, then this seems to indicate that lip 
service is being paid to the requirement of prejudice and it is really 
unnecessary to the enquiry. 
96 See note 8. 
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6 The Fault Principle 
In Saambou-Nasiona1e Bouvereniging v Friedman97 Jansen JA, obiter dictum, 
left open the question whether proof of fault was a requirement for the 
application of the reliance theory. He referred to the various views of the 
academics: De Wet and Yeats98 and De Vos 99 who regard the test (to be 
applied where there is dissensus) as one of estoppel, which requires fault 
on the part of the party who induced the reliance by the other party, and 
Kerr100 who does not require fault for the application of his theory, which, 
I submit amounts to a form of reliance theory. Jansen JA further considered 
the legal pas it ion in the Netherlands: the app l i cation of the reliance 
theory without the requirement of fault. 101 
Since then, a decision which merits mention is Harty Investments (Pty) Ltd 
v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd102 , to which Harms AJA referred in the Sonap 
case. In Harty's case, Coetzee J, in applying the doctrine of iustus error, 
said: 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
Supra note 13. 
De Wet and van Wyk op cit note 8 at 19. See now JC De 
Wet and AH van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg Vol I 5 ed (1992) 22. 
W de Vos "Mistake in Contract" Essays in Honour of Ben 
Beinart I (1978) 1 (also found in (1976) Acta Juridica 
177 at 180-1, cited in note 8). 
AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 2 ed 
(1975) 12. See now AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law 
of Contract 4 ed (1989). 
Jansen JA, at 997 A, expressed the opinion that the 
reference to 'toerekenbaarheid' did not impute a 
requirement of fault. 
Supra note 21. 
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'Only to a limited category of mistakes wi ll the law attach the 
quality of 11 "iustus 11 , and the fault principle looms large in the 
determination of this question. 1103 
Coetzee J concluded that '(t)he mistaken party will .•. not be able to rely 
on the lack of true consensus if his mistake was due to his own fault• and 
that 'the fault principle similarly applies to the second party who seeks 
to hold the mistaken one to the contract. He must be blameless. If he is 
also to b l arne then the first party is not bound. • 104 
These conclusions were based on Coetzee J•s interpretation of what Fagan CJ, 
in George v Fa"irmead (Pty) ltd105 , regarded as the "iustus error test, 
namely, 
'Has the party - the one who is trying to resile - been to blame in 
the sense that by his conduct he has led the other party, as a 
reasonable man, to believe that he was binding himself? 1106 
As Sharrock1~ points out, Coetzee J•s conclusion is based on the 
attribution of a sense, or meaning, of 'blame• which is not the sense, or 
meaning intended by Fagan CJ. If one intends using the test of Fagan CJ as 
authority for the proposition that 'blame• is required, then the concept of 
'blame• cannot be equated with fault. It should rather be understood in the 
sense in which Fagan CJ intended to use it, namely, that one party is 'to 
blame• if he has conducted himself so as to lead the other party reasonably 
to believe that he was binding himself. 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
.At 539 G. 
At 540 C. 
Supra note 23. 
At 471 B - C. 
RD Sharrock 'Fault and Iustus Error• (1985) SALJ 1 at 
3. 
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It should also be noted that Fagan CJ stated 
'If his' (the first party's) 'mistake is due to a misrepresentation, 
whether innocent or fraudulent,• (my emphasis) 'by the other party, 
then, of course it is the second party who is to blame and the first 
party iS nOt bOUnd. 1108 
Clearly, the learned Chief Justice postulated that the second party would 
be 'to blame•, even if his representation had been innocently made! 
Thus my submission is that the fault principle does not loom as large as 
Coetzee J might have believed. However, on a correct interpretation of the 
words of Fagan CJ, fault (on the part of the party who made a 
misrepresentation to the other, which led to the mistake being made) is not 
a requirement for the app 1 i cation of the 1 ustus error doctrine. 109 
Furthermore, as Sharrock, in my view, correctly submi tted110 , there is a 
wea 1 th of authority which does not require fau 1t. B 1 ackburn J, in his 
dictum, never mentioned carelessness or negligence as a requirementm and 
there is Appe 11 ate Oi vision authori ty112 for the app 1 i cation of the doctrine 
of iustus error or the reliance theory without reference to any requirement 
of culpability. 
lOB 
109 
110 
111 
112 
At 471 C - D. 
See also Beck 'Mistake and Fault' (1985) SALJ 8, who 
feels that the introduction of the fault principle may 
lead to confusion. 
Op cit note 107 at 3. 
See also Christie op cit note 18 at 27, who submits 
that Blackburn J did not intend that fault should be 
a requirement. 
See, for example, Diamond v Kernick 1947 (3) SA 69 (A) 
at 83; Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) 
SA 413 (A) at 430; Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 (1) SA 418 
(a) at 425; Spes Bona Bank Ltd v Portals Water 
Treatment South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 978 (A) 
at 984. 
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In Sonap's case Harms AJA felt, in my view quite correctly, that in holding 
that a mistaken party is not able to rely on the lack of true consensus if 
his mistake was due to his own fault, Coetzee J had obviously been 
influenced by the view expressed by JC De Wet 113 whose thesis was based on 
the estoppe 1 approach. Harms AJA a 1 so observed114 that Coetzee J had re 1 i ed 
heavily on the use of the word 'blame' by Fagan CJ, yet Fagan CJ did not 
equate 'blame' with negligence but rather as conduct which led the other 
party, as a reasonable man, to believe that his apparent intention was his 
true intention. 
In addition, Harms AJA took into account the practical difficulties inherent 
in the application of a test which incorporates the fault principle, by 
referring to Kahn who commented, with regard to the decision in Nas1ona1e 
Behu1s1ngskomm1ss1e v Grey71ng115 that if one weighs up the degree of fault 
on the part of each party then 'the unreasonable error by one party may be 
rendered reasonable by the greater unreasonableness of an error made by the 
other party! ' 116 
Khan's comment was made in light of the statement by the court, in Nas1ona1e 
Behu1s1ngskomm1ss1e v Grey11ng, that because the buyer had been even more 
careless than the seller, the seller was entitled to an order that the 
contract was of no force. Mclennan 1 eve 1 s a simi 1 ar criticism at the 
reasoning behind the decision in Nas1ona1e Behu1s1ngskomm1ss1e v Grey11ng, 
in that Schabort J 'seems to suggest that, since the respondent was also to 
b 1 arne for the mistake, the error became 1 ustus. ' 117 My submission is that 
such an approach, namely that an unreasonable error may become reasonable 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
JC De Wet Dwaling en Bedrog by Kontraksluiting (1943). 
In Sonap's case supra note 1 at 240 E. 
Supra note 21. 
Kahn op cit note 5 at 300. 
J S McLennan 'Iustus Error, Snatching at Bargains, and 
Rectification' (1987) 104 SALJ 382 at 384. 
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by virtue of a less reasonable error on the part of the other party, flies 
in the face of fundamental principles of. logic. 118 
The same criticism may be levelled at the views of Van der Merwe and Van 
Huyssteen119 and Van der Merwe et a 1120 , that the reasonableness of the 
reliance upon consensus by one party may depend upon the 'unacceptability' 
of the representation which was made by the other. 121 
Floyd and Pretorius122 submit that the relative blameworthiness of the 
parties must always be weighed up: that equal forms of blame will negate 
each other and prevent a contract from coming into being, while a "stronger" 
form of blameworthiness will override a 11Weaker" form. 123 If the party whose 
actual intention differs from his expressed intention is to be held bound 
his form of blameworthiness must always be the stronger. 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
See also C Lewis 'Caveat Subscriptor and the Doctrine 
of Iustus Error' (1987) 104 SALJ 311 at 376. Cf M 
Brassey who, in a paper entitled 'Mistake and 
Misrepresentation', delivered at the Law Teachers 
Conference at the University of Port Elizabeth in July 
1994, submits that 'the relative degree of blame is 
the primary determinant: it seems unfair to saddle one 
party with the consequences of rescission if the other 
party is more to blame for the flawed contract.' See 
page 15 of the synopsis of the paper which was made 
available at the conference. 
Op cit note 51 at 497. 
Op cit note 9 at 38. 
JS Me Lennan Review of Van der Merwe et al Contract 
General Principles (1994) SALJ 210. 
Op cit note 48; see also Floyd and Pretorius op cit 
note 55 at 327. 
Intention, negligence and risk 
blameworthiness, becoming lesser, 
order mentioned. 
being forms of 
by degree, in the 
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With respect I cannot agree with the authors. My submission is that it is 
precisely such an approach which Kahn 124 apparently disapproved, and which 
Harms AJA quite correctly sought to avoid125 • The only authority cited for 
such an approach is a work on the law of delict. 126 I submit that, while 
weighing up the blameworthiness of the parties may be pertinent to the 
determination of issues pertaining to delictual liability, or involving 
contributory negligence or apportionment of damages, it is irrelevant to the 
present question of whether or not a contract has come into existence. 127 
Where the party who creates the reliance does so by means of an intentional 
(fraudulent) misrepresentation and the other party is misled unreasonably, 
I submit that the situation is as follows: 
If the misrepresentation is one in the sense in which it was used by Harms 
AJA in the formulation of his test 128 , namely, a representation by one party 
that his declared intention is his actual intention, then this amounts to 
conduct on the part of one party which creates the impression that he 
intends to bind himself on certain terms. In such an instance the reliance 
theory is applicable in order to determine whether a contract has come into 
existence: if the one party induced the other party reasonably to rely on 
the bel i ef that the former intended to contract on certain terms, then 
despite d1ssensus, a contract exists on the terms relied upon by the second 
party, regardless of whether the first party was at fault. 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
Op cit note 5 at 300. 
In Sonap's case, at 240 F - G. 
Namely J Neethling, JM Potgieter and PJ Visser Law of 
Delict (1990) 134. 
See also NJ Grove 'Sonap Petroleum (formerly known as 
Sonarep) (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 
234 (A)' (1994) De Jure 185. 
In Sonap's case, at 240 A. 
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On the other hand, if the misrepresentation is one in the .. proper senseulZ9, 
and by this I mean a statement by one of the parties which induces the other 
party to enter into the contract and which the parties did not intend to 
become a term of the contract, 130 there is not d1 ssensus, but rather 
consensus which has been obtained by improper means. In this situation the 
reliance theory has no application; a contract has come into existence and 
the appropriate rules to be applied are those regarding misrepresentation. 
These rules have developed131 specifically to cater for fraudulent, 
negligent and innocent misrepresentation and to provide the remedies of 
rescission and restitution and, in some circumstances, an award of damages, 
where necessary. 
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle of our law that a person who makes 
a fraudulent misrepresentation cannot be heard to say that the party who was 
induced by such misrepresentation to act, was at fault, or should bear the 
loss merely because he was careless or stupid. 
As was so aptly stated in the American case Chamberlain v Fu11er132 : 
'No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder for the simple reason 
that his victim is a fool.' 
This principle must prevail in any situation where a fraudulent 
misrepresentation in the 11 proper sense .. has been made. 
129 
130 
131 
132 
JS Me Lennan 'Reliance and Iustus Error Theories of 
Contract' (1994) SALJ 232 at 236 - 7 refers to such a 
misrepresentation as one in the 'narrow legal sense'. 
RH Christie op cit note 18 at 328. 
See Laurens v Genis 1962 (1) SA 431 (T); cf Otto v 
Heymans 1971 ( 4) SA 148 (T), where the test for 
materiality was regarded as whether the reasonable 
person would have considered the fact misrepresented 
to him as important, in deciding whether to enter into 
the contract or not. 
(1887) 59 Vt. 247 at 256. 
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Thus my submission is that there is not necessarily any relationship between 
fault on the part of one party and the reasonableness of the reliance by the 
other, but that the test for the existence of contractual l i abi l i ty is 
simply whether a representation made by one party as to the terms upon which 
he intended to contract (or, in other words, conduct by the one party) 
induced a reasonable reliance upon consensus by the other party. Of crucial 
importance are the following factors: conduct, inducement and reasonable 
reliance. 
The position is the same where the mi stake is brought about by the 
fraudulent conduct, or misrepresentation, of a third party for whose acts 
neither of the contracting parties i s responsible. 133 The situation, without 
any reference to fault on the part of either of the two contracting parties, 
would be as follows: In terms of the consensual (intention) theory, there 
would be no consensus. In terms of the reliance theory, an enquiry must be 
held as to whether there was a representation, or conduct, on the part of 
one party which induced the other to form a reasonable reliance upon 
consensus. 13' If not, then there would be no contract between the parties ; 
if the answer is in the affirmative, then the party who formed such 
reasonable reliance upon consensus may hold the other contractually bound. 
Of course, an independent delictual action may lie, at the instance of 
either of the contracting parties, against the third party, for any loss 
suffered in consequence of the fraudulent conduct of such third party. 
This situation, I submit, is governed by, and is in accordance with, 
recognised, equitable principles of our law. 
133 As in Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Naicker 1987 
(2) SA 49 (N). Cf Kok v Osborne 1993 (4) SA 788 (SEC) 
where the fraudulent misrepresentation was made to the 
defendant by a third party whom the plaintiff 
permitted to enter into negotiations with, and convey 
legal documents to, defendant on her behalf. 
Of course, if the other party was aware or should have 
been aware of a mistake, then he would be under a duty 
to speak and enquire. 
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7 The Risk Principle 
In Sonap's case no reference was made to the risk principle. However, in 
Saambou Nasionale-Bouvereniging v Friedman13S, Jansen JA, having raised the 
question whether fault was required for the application of the reliance 
theory, considered whether the risk principle applied in South African law. 
The learned judge of appeal was not conclusive on this aspect, and we may 
well ask ourselves whether, in light of the decision in Sonap's case, we are 
in a better position to determine whether the risk principle should apply 
in our law. 
The risk principle may be explained thus: Where a party chooses a specific 
method of communication13\ or a messenger, or an intermediary, for the 
communication of hi s offer to the other party and such offer becomes 
distorted or garbled in its transmission, so that the offer is communicated 
to the other party incorrectly, in spite of the absence of fault on the part 
of the first party, he must bear the loss on the basis that he bears the 
risk of using that method of communication or a messenger or intermediary. 
The same applies to communication of acceptance. 
With specific reference to the case of the garbled telegram, Jansen JA 137 
observed that in the Netherlands the risk principle applies, although 
Meijers 1~ has reservations as to whether it has universal application, in 
light of cons ide rations that each party should be responsible for his 
circumstances, as far as they concern himself, but should perhaps not be 
held responsible for the mistake or fault of a third party. 
135 Supra note 13. 
136 A classic example is the use of the telegram. 
137 In Saambou's case supra note 13. 
138 Op cit note 90 at 98. 
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In Germani39 the principle is that the sender of the telegram is not 
necessarily bound, but would be liable for damages. In English Law the 
sender is not liable. 1~ In the United States of America there are 
conflicting decisions. 141 
In Stewart v Zagreb Propert 1 es ( Pvt) L td142 the court made reference to 
Williston143 , on the position in the United States, but decided against 
applying the risk principle on the basis that it was contrary to the 
principle in our law that where an agent exceeds his mandate he cannot bind 
his principal. Lubbe and Murray1~ submit that this decision illustrates how 
poorly the risk principle and its requirements are understood in our law. 
As far as South African writers are concerned, Kahn 145 and Francis 146 tend 
to favour the approach in the Netherlands. Francis submits 147 that ' ( t) he 
agency doctrine causes more problems than it solves; whereas the doctrine 
that the sender of the telegram is not responsible for errors 1n 
transm1ss1o, but often has inequitable results.• Kahn 1~ feels that the risk 
principle should apply, subject to two provisos. First, the sender of a 
telegram should take all reasonable steps to ensure that it will be 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
In terms of sections 120-2 of BGB. 
As decided in Henkel v Pape (1870) 6 LR Ex 7. 
s Williston A Treatise on the Law of Contracts revised 
ed (1957 - 76) 296. 
1971 (2) SA 346 (RA). 
Op cit note 141. 
Op cit note 22 at 163. 
E Kahn 'Some Mysteries of Offer and Acceptance• (1955) 
SALJ 246. 
MJD Francis 'Two Aspects of Contracting by Telegram• 
(1967) SALJ 218. 
Op cit note 146 at 286. 
Op cit note 145 at.266. 
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correctly transmitted, for instance, by stating amounts in words as well as 
figures. Secondly, there will be no contract where the party not initiating 
use of telegrams knew or suspected or should have known of the error, 
whether through the prior dealings of the parties, his knowledge of the 
market or any other cause. Kerr14\ whose approach is reminiscent of the 
German approach, fee 1 s that for the party who suggested the method of 
communication to bear the risk is a little harsh or burdensome and feels 
there should be no contract but should be liable for wasted expenditure. 
These and other factors were considered by Jansen JA in Saambou-Nas1onale 
Bouveren1g1ng v Fr1edman150 • 
Floyd and Pretorius151 submit that Harms AJA•s test 152 for liability based 
on the reliance theory, without reference to fault or risk, cannot be 
applied where there is no fault on the part of either party, but that the 
risk principle must be applied in order to bring about an equitable 
solution. 
Floyd and Pretorius further submit that the court, in Kok v Osborne15\ in 
the absence of fault on the part of either plaintiff or defendant, 
effectively took into account the blameworthiness of the plaintiff, in 
creating the risk that her messenger could misrepresent her intention to the 
defendant, by deciding that defendant•s mistake was 1ustus and that he could 
escape 1 i ab i 1 i ty on the apparent contract. 154 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
Op cit note 100 at 30. 
Supra note 13. 
Op cit note 48. 
In Sonap's case supra note 1. 
1993 (4) SA 788 (SEC) . 
Floyd and Pretorius op cit note 55 at 328. However, 
see also J S McLennan op cit note 129 at 235-6. It is 
submitted that the decision in Kok v Osborne may be 
explained on the basis that defendant was not bound as 
he was reasonably induced into his mistake by the 
words or conduct of a person whom plaintiff permitted 
to act for her. 
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The thesis that fault plays no role in the enquiry as to whether, in the 
absence of actual consensus, one party should be held bound to the other, 
does not logically admit the application of the risk principle. After all, 
why should the bearing of risk (which is apparently less reprehensible than 
being at fault) affect such enquiry? On the other hand, in the absence of 
fault on the part of both parties, how else would one equitably resolve the 
issue of which of the two innocent parties should bear the loss, without 
having recourse to the risk principle? 
What must be borne in mind is that, in the factual circumstances of Sonap's 
case, it was unnecessary for the court to decide whether the risk principle 
should be applied or not. The test was formulated according to the facts 
before the court. However, I see no reason why, in appropriate 
circumstances, the enquiry (as formulated by Harms AJA in Sonap's case) 
should not be extended to cover the situation where the false impression (as 
to the terms upon which one party intended to contract with the other) was 
created by a third party. 
What is relevant is a representation, or conduct, by one party which induces 
a reasonable reliance upon consensus by the other. One may view the conduct 
of the first party, in, for example, choosing a specific method of 
communication of his intention to the other party, as creating the situation 
in which the other party may reasonably be led to believe that the expressed 
intention of the former (as communicated to the latter via the chosen 
method) represents his actual intention. If this is the case, then the first 
party may be regarded as conducting himself in such a way as to induce the 
other party reasonably to believe that he is binding himself on certain 
terms. Consequently the second party may hold the first party contractually 
bound. 
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It must not be forgotten, however, that the reliance by the second party (to 
whom the intention of the first is incorrectly communicated) must be 
reasonable. Therefore, if the second party realised, or should have realised 
as a reasonable man that there was a real possibility of a mistake in the 
communication15\ or that the representation made by the third party was 
incorrect, then he would have a duty to speak and to enquire whether the 
expressed intention was the actual intention, 156 or whether the 
representation was correct. In such circumstances, failure to do so, and 
acting in re 1 i ance upon the expressed intention, or representation, wi 11 not 
result in the first party being held bound. 
To the extent that the first party is being held 'responsible' for the 
incorrect communication of his intention by another, where he created the 
situation which led to it, one may regard this as the application of the 
risk principle. However, my submission is that we are concerned, not so much 
with 'blameworthy' conduct, in the sense of the reprehensibility of the 
taking of a risk, but rather, with the causative effects of the method 
employed by the first party to communicate his intention to the other. 157 
155 
156 
157 
For example, if some words contained in the telegram 
are garbled, or if for some reason it does not make 
sense. 
See Sonap's case supra note 1 at 241. 
Whether the incorrect communication, by a third party, 
of the intention of the first party may be regarded as 
a novus actus interveniens, for which the first party 
may not be held. responsible, will have to be 
considered according to the particular facts of each 
case. It may well be argued, however, that, in any 
event, the incorrect communication of one's intention 
may well be a 'risk inherent' in permitting a third 
party to act on one's behalf, and consequently cannot 
be regarded as a novus actus interveniens. 
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8 Conclusion 
,r submit that the court, in Sonap's case, attempted to put behind it the 
(complications that had been experienced in the_pa~. An attempt was made to 
~extract from the quagmire of academic debate and apparently conflicting 
judicial precedent, a clear, workable formula for the direct application of 
1the reliance theory in cases of actual d1ssensus between parties to an 
f apparent contract. 
The enquiry, as formulated by Harms AJA, admits the practical application 
of the doctrine of 1ustus error, for which there is firmly established 
precedent in South African law. It also recognizes the requirement of good 
faith, in that it imposes upon the parties a 'duty to speak and enquire•. 
Further, a flexible application of the enquiry, to suit the various factual 
circumstances which may arise, by, for example, incorporating the risk 
principle to the extent discussed above, provides scope for a fair and 
equitable solution which would conform with development and practice in 
foreign jurisdictions. 
Sonap's case has been cited and applied with approval by our courts. 1~ The 
test for contractual liability in the absence of consensus, as stated in 
Sonap's case, without reference to fault, is based upon the d1ctum of 
B 1 ackburn J which has stood for more than a century. The precedent 
established in Sonap's case may very well, similarly, stand the test of 
time. 
l.SB Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd supra note 16 at 61 F. 
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